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LEGISLATIVL TAX-EXEMPT ION CONTRACTS.
I.
The Question Stated.
The sovereignty of the state is essentially indi-
visible and inalienable. In the last analysis it re-
poses in the people themselves. It may be granted to
a single individual. It may be delegated to public
representatives. It may be lodged in co-ordinate branch
es of government. Two or more states may even by mutu-
al consent yield the exercise of specified powers to a
joint government, and thereby limit the extent, though
not the content, of their individual sovereignty. But
in all these cases the incidents of sovereignty are
given into the hands of public officers, and the same
power that granted may revoke . Once lodged, the sov-
ereignty remains until recalled. In no case is it con-
ceivable that these temporary trustees can transmit
to others the trust that they have received, or give,
grant or barter away any of its essential powers.
2In our modern representative governments this prin-
ciple is practically conceded. Whatever is non-essen-
tial or incidental may be the subject of legislative
gift or contract, but whatever is essential and of the
essence of sovereignty is lodged permanently in th e peo-
ple and can be disturbed only with their consent. If
one legislature, by gift or contract, attempt to dis-
pose of any of these essentials, no right vests in the
beneficiary other than the right of present enjoyment
subject to the pleasure of the same or a subsequent leg-
islature. Blackstone has stated the rule broadly that
"Acts of Parliament derogatory from the power of sub-
sequent parliaments bind not," putting the rule upon
the ground that "the legislature, being in truth the sov-
ereign power, is always of equal, always of absolute
authority." (1 Black. Com. 90.) And the rule is
equally sound under our republican form of government,
subject only to the limitation that the legislature is
0
See also Perchard vs. Hleyward, K.B.,8 T.R., 458, a tax case
in which it is said ; "It cannot be contended that a
subsequent act of parliament will not control the pro-
vision of a prior statute, if it were intended to have
that operation".
not, like the British parliamcnt, an omnipotent body,
but is amenable always to the constitution, and must
act within the well defined limits of that instrument.
But nowhere in any American constitution is there to be
found any authority under which a legislature can barter
away the essentials of sovereignty. The founders of
the Republic would have stood amazed at any proposition
looking to that end. While individual States were ask-
ed to yield up certain of the incidents of sovereignty
to be exercised in their behalf by a superior govern-
ment of which they were a part, they retained in undi-
minished vigor all rights and power not expressly grant-
ed. These they exercised within their respective ju-
risdictions with the same absolute freedom and under the
same political sanction as if wholly independent states.
And these, or such of these as are essential to their
separate political existence, they cannot dispose of or
in any way abridge, and still remain sovereign states.
While the rule is thus broad and inclusive there
has been in one particular a wide and dangerous depart-
ure from it in the course of American jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court of the United States has established
and thus far maintained the doctrine that a State can
by contract yield for a term of years or forever its
right of taxation. It is conceded that it cannot thus
bind itself to an irrevocable contract for the non-ex-
ercise of the right of police or of eminent domain, pow
ers certainly not more important or of higher rank in
the scale of sovereign attributes than the right of
taxation. It may, therefore, well be asked on what
theory and by wha. process of reasoning the courts have
come to establish this one notable exception to so
sweeping a rule. To point out the origin of the doc-
-.trine of irrevocable tax-exemption.contracts, the rea-
soning upon which it rests, the opposition with which
it has been received, and the limitations with which
it has been hedged about, will be the object of this
paper.
II
Legislative Contracts in General.
In the absence of constitutional restrictions a
State legislature would wield such absolute sway as to
be able to make and break contracts at will. This
follows naturally from the character of the legislative
power. It was, indeed, questioned by the eminent jur-
ist, Chief, Justice Marshall, "Whether the nature of soci-
ety and of government does not prescribe some limit to
the legislative power," but he concedes in the same
breath that the problem is practically insoluble..
(Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 135. ) In Dartmouth
Col.lege vs. Woodward (4 Wheat. b18, 643) he says : "Ac-
cording to the theory of the British constitution, their
Parliament is omnipotent", and in Owings vs. Speed
(5 Wheat. 420.) he refused to protect the beneficiary of
a legislative grant from the operation of a subsequent
act divesting suc-h beneficiary of his title under the
grant, and placed the decision on the ground that pre-
vious to the adoption of the Federal Constitution there
was no check on the supreme power of a State legisla-
ture. Other decisions in the Federal Courts have re-
affirmed the sane doctrine. (League vs. De Young 11
How. 185.) It may be broadly asserted that a legis-
lature, untrammeled by constitutional checks, is prac-
tically omnipotent.
It next becomes important to inquire what checkp,
if any, have been placed upon the power of a legislature
to make, enforce, or revoke contracts. It is not our
6purpose to deal with such restraints as have been impos-
ed in State constitutions, but only with the clause of
the Federal Constitution under which acts of State 1-g-
islatures relating to contracts have been repeatedly
annulled. The first clause of the tenth seution of
Article 1. of the ConstitTution of the United States
provides that "No State shall ... pass any bill of at-
tainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obli-
gation of contracts." Under this clause there has
grown up a series of judicial decisions remarkable not
only for their great learning but also for the incalcula-
ble effect that they have had upon important public and
private interests. And it is to t'cse that we must
look for the law in restraint of legislative action con-
cerning contracts.
The phrase, "impairing the obligation of contracts,"
is attributed, upon just what authority is uncertain,
to Judge Wilson, a Scottish lawyer profoundly learned in
the civil law and one of the ablest members of the Con-
stitutional Convention. It was first proposed in the
convention to adopt a somewhat similar clause from the
Ordinances for the Government of the North-West Territo-
ry, which provided that "in the just preservation of
7rights and property, it is understood and declared, that
no law ought ever to be made, or have force in said ter-
ritory, that shall, in any manner whatever, interfere
with or affect private contracts or engagements, bona
fide and without fraud, previously formed." This prop-
osition did not meet with favor, and the clause as it
now stands was finally adopted.
Just what the co.nvention meant to guard against in
making this phrase a part of the fundamental law, has
been the subject of much learned discussion. The sub-
ject was scarcely mentioned during the heated controversy
that followed the completion of the work of the conven-
tion. It is referred to but twice in The Federalist,
once by Hamilton in No. VII of that famous collection,
and once by Madison in No. XLIV. When it first came
up for interpretation by the Supreme Court the journal
of the convention and the LMadison papers yet lay in man-
uscript and were inaccessible ; Judge Wilson, its prob-
able author,was dead ; and the court, to quote Chief
Justice Marshall, decided the question from "the meaning
of words i-n common use." Probably the court employed
the best resources at its command, but the student of
our judicial history will, in the light of subsequent
8events, read with some surprise the able Chief Justice's
assertion that "it would seem difficult to substitute
words which are more intelligible or less liable to mis-
construction," and that "the words of the constitution
are express, A, and incapable of being misunderstood."
(Sturges vs. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 197. ) From all
the evidence thus far adduced, it seems altogether prob-
able that the framers of the constitution meant simply
to place a prohibition upon State legislation impairing
the obligation of private contracts, and to set up in
civil cases the same safeguard as is provided in crimi-
nal cases by the clause forbidding the passage of ex
post facto laws. Eut whatever the intention of the
authors of the clause, the courts gave to it so elastic
an interpretation as to bring within its scope all con-
tracts, executed and executory, private and legislative.
The question of legislative contracts first came
up with reference to a grant of land made by the State
of Georgia to private individuals and afterwards revoked
on the ground that the grant had been obtained by fraud.
Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court
OSee Shirley's The Dartmouth College Causes, pp. 213 22R.
9and settled once for all these propositions : (1) a grant
by.State is a contract ; (2) a contract with a State is
within the prohibition of the clause of the constitution
forbidding a State to pass any law impairing the obli-
gation of contracts. (Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch 87.)
This doctrine of irrevocable legislative grants was soon
after fully re-affirmed. (Terrett vs. Taylor, 9 Cranch
43 ; Town of Pawlet vs. Clark, 9 Cranch 335. )
From the doctrine of irrevocable grants of corporeal
property, the court passed to that of the irrevocable
grant of franchises. Charters of incorporation were
held to be contracts within the intent of the consti-
tution and to be beyond the future control of the law-
making power. This doctrine was first enunciated in
the now famous case of Trustees of Dartmouth College vs.
Woodward. (4 Wheat. 519. ), and has been repeatedly re-
affirmed. (Planters', Bank vs. Sharp, 6 How. 301 ; Thu
Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 73 ; Louisville Gas Co. vs.
Citizens Gas Co., 115 U. S. 683.)
Thus under this clause of the constitution, in-
tended doubtless for the protection of private contracts
from legislative interference, there grew up the doc-
trine that a legislature can make a contract so binding
10
as completely to tie the hands of all subsequent legis-
latures, so immovable that it can never be disturbed,
amended, or repealed. The result has been far from
favorable to public interests. Established without
warrant of precedent or tradition, the doctrine has be-
come so settled and stringent in its application, so
comprehensive and far-reaching in its scope, that under
its protection, to quote the words of one of the ablest
of modern commentators, "the most enormous and threaten-
ing powers in our country have been created ; some of
the great and wealthy corporations actually having great-
er influence in the country at large than the States to
which they owe their corporate existence. Every pri-
vilege granted or conferred,- no matter by what means or
on what pretence - being made inviolable by the consti-
tution, the government is frequently stripped of its
authority in very important particulars, by unwise, care-
less, or corrupt legislation ; and a clause of the feder-
al constitution, whose purpose was to preclude the re-
pudiation of debts and just contracts, protects and per-
petuates the evil." (Cooley's Constitutional Limita-
tions, 4th ed., p. 340, note) As we shall see pres-
ently, in no respect is this unwise legislation more
ii
frequent or pernicious than in the granting of tax-examp-
tion contracts, and one of the Justices of the Supreme
Court has borne witness that ib is this class of con-
tract cases that "most frequently calls for the exercise
of EtheirJsupervi-sory power". (Murray vs. Charleston,
96 U. S. 432.)
III,
Irrevocable Tax-Exemption Contracts.
The case of the State of New Jersey vs. Wilson,
(7 Cranch 164) decided in 1812, is the first of a long
line of cases dealing with legislative contracts as to
taxation. The circumstance of the case were briefly
as follows. The Delaware Indians had, in 1758, yield-
ed their claim to certain portions of New Jersey under
an agreement by which they were to be forever secured
in the possession of a tract of land of about three
thousand acres to be purchased for their use and to be
exempted fron taxation. They resided on this tract
until 1801 when the remnant of the trie secured the
passage of an act whereby they were empowered to sell the
land and migrate to an Indian settlement in New York.
This enabling act contained no provision whatever on
the subject of taxation. The lands were sold in com-
pliance with the act, and pasned into the possession of
private individuals. Soon afterward the legislature
repealed the provision of the act of 1758 relating to
taxation, and efforts were made to levy and collect the
prescribed taxes. The owners of the land brought suit
to test the validity of the repealing act, and, after
the courts of New Jersey had decided adversely to them,
carried the case to the Supreme Court of the United
States where it was submitted without argument. Chief
Justice Marshall read the opinion of' the court re-affirm-
ing the doctrine of Fletcher vs. Peck that the constitu-
tional prohibition extends to contracts to which a State
is a party as well as to contracts between individuals
holding that the act of 1758 constituted a contract, and
that the privilege of exemption from taxation was annex-
ed to the lands and not to the persons of the proprie-
tors ; and deciding that as the State of New Jersey did
not insist on thie surrender of this privilege in the en-
abling act of 1801, the purchasers under that act ac-
quired all the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the
Delawares. The subsequent act intended to annul this
13
exemption was therefore adjudged unconstitutional on the
ground that it impaired the obligation of the original
contract.
Whatever may be thought of the other cases held to
fall within the prohibitory clause concerning contracts,
there can be no question but that this involved conse-
quences of the gravest character, and gave form to a
series of judicial decisions that have met with'strong
and well grounded opposition. It was probably the
first time in the history of jurisprudence that the
sovereign power of taxation had been adjudged the prop-
er subject-matter of contract. So imperative a neces-
sity exists for the exercise of this power, that it is
of the very essence of political autonomy. To hold
that one legislature can forever bind the State to the
non-exercise of this prerogative, is to hold that the
legislature can destroy the State, by taking from it
the means of existence. It will be shown later how the
Supreme Court shrank from the logical consequences of
its own decision, and how sundry of the judges refused
further assent to so dangerous and irrational a doc-
trine.
Fortunately we are not left in doubt as to the at-
titude of the present court toward this leading case on
tax-exemption contracts. In 1885 exactly the same
state of facts came before the court. It appears that
for a long period of years after the decision in 11cw Jer-
sey vs. Wilson, the owners of the exempt tract content-
ed themselves with the right to an extraordinary privi-
lege and failed to insist upon its exercise. But after
the lapse of sixty years some owner of a portion of the
exempt land again asserted his right to immunity from
taxation, and refused to pay his assessments. This led
to the important determination to be found in Given vs.
Wright, 117 U. S. 648. Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking
for the court in that case, says :
"TWe do not feel disposed to question the decision
in New Jersey vs. Wilson. It has been referred to and
relied on in so many cases from the day of its rendition
down to the present time, that it would cause a shock to
our constitutional jurisprudence to disturb it now. If
the question were a new one we might regard the reason-
ing of the New Jersey judges as entitled to a great deal
of weight, especially since the emphatic declarations
made by this court in Providence Bank vs. Billings, 4 Pe;.
514, msd other cases, as to the necessity of having the
clearest legislative expression in order to impair the
taxing power of the State."
"The question, then, will be whether the long ac-
quiescence of the land owners under the imposition of
taxes, raises a presumption that the exemption, which
once existed, has been surrendered."
And on this last ground, thus painfully sought out
that the leading case might stand undisturbed, the
court decides that, as the original exemption was a
franchise and as taxes have been assessed and paid for
sixty years the non-user of the franchise for that period
amounts to "presumptive proof of its abandonment or sur-
render."
While the decision in New Jersey vs. Wilson was
thus open to criticism, its full significance was no;
seen until another, and more famous case, had been ad-
judicated in the highest court of the Republic.
The decision in The Dartmouth College Case gave to
the tax-exemption contract doctrine an instant and tre-
mendous importance. That decision, as everybody knows,
declared that the charter of a private corporation is a
contract and within the protection of the constitution
of the United States. The inevitable conclusion fol-
lowed that an exemption from taxation contained in a
charter creating a corporation, is a part of such char-
ter and partakes of its inviolability. It was speedily
seen by those interested that a rule of law which was
adopted to protect a deserving charity could be as
easily invoked to protect a moneyed corporation or a
greedy monopoly. Corporations have been swift to avail
themselves of this knowledge. Under the aegis of
The Dartmouth College Case the most oppressive monopo]lCS
have sheltered themselves from the legislative action of
the very power to whose indulgence they owe their exis-
tence. Attempts of legislatures to cut off or of
courts to curb the dangerous exercise of corporate fran-
chises have invariably been met by an appeal to this de-
cision ; and it is not too much to say that corporations
may justly claim the famous document as their historic
Magna Charta. The words of Chief Justice Richardson
in reading the opinion of the New Hampshire court have,
after the lapse of seventy years, almost the ring of
prophecy ;
"If the charter of a public institution, like that
of Dartmouth College, is to be construed as a contract
within the intent of the Constitution of the United
States, it will, in our opinion, be difficult to say
what powers, in relation to their public institutions,
if any, are left to the State. It is a construction,
in our view, repugnant to the very principles of all
government, because it places all public institutions
of all the States beyond legislative control." (Farrar's
Report of the Case of Dartmouth College, etc., p. 230. )
In the face of all of these considerations the
Supreme Court held the charter of a corporation a more
sacred thing than the sovereignty of a people. All
Englisli law aid precedents were thrust aside. In
Engl tnd the right of parliament to dissolve a corpora-
tion or to amend its charter had never been successful-
ly questioned. (1 Blk. Com. 485 ; 2 Kyd on Corp. 447)
The creature of law, owing its life to the breath of
legislative or royal favor, it was amenable throughout
its existence to its creator. The most powerful cor-
poration,- like that known as the East India Company,-
yielded their charter rights and even their corporate
life at the will of parliament. But in the United
States another doctrine was solemnly promulgated. Exist
ing corporations, the term of whose life was not fixed
by t leir charter might truly claim the attribute of im-
mortality. States were warned that if they wished to
maintain any control over future corporations, they must
do so by reserving t: at right in all charters thereafter
granted. In a word, the attempt of the framers of the
constitution to protect the sanctity of contracts had
been broadened into a foundation for the most obnoxious
monopolies.
The case of the Piqua Branch of the State Bank of
Ohio vs. Knoop ( 16 How. 369) is of great importance as
containing the first thorough discussion of all ques-
tions involved in legislative tax-exemption contracts.
The State of Ohio had in 1845 passed a general banking
act, one provision of which was that each banking comnpa-
ny organized under the act should semi-annually set off
six per cent. on its net profits in lieu of all taxes
to which the company or the stockholders therein would
otherwise be subject. The Piqua Branch was organized
under this act in 1847. In 1851 the legislature pass-
ed an act "to tax banks, and bank and other stocks, the
',
same as property is now taxable by the laws of the State.
A tax was levied upon the Piqua Branch Bank under this
act and upon the bank's refusing payment, suit was
brought by the State for its enforcement. The bank
set up as a defence that the tax imposed was in viola-
tion of its charter. 'he Supreme Court of Ohio sus-
tained the validity of the tax, and the case was appeal-
ed to the Supreme Court of the United States. Here a
decision was given in favor of the bank, the opinion
being read by Mr. Justice M'Lean, the sole survivor, as
he pathetically remarks in the course of his opinion,
of the famous bench of judges of which Eiarshall and
Story were leading lights. The opinion is learned and
exhaustive, conceived in the spirit of Marshall's ear-
lier decisions, and buttressed with much of that great
19
master's invincible logic. It had previously been decid
ed in Gordon vs. Appeal Tax Court ( 3 How. 133. ) that an
annual bonus in lieu of taxation, fixed by the charter
of a banking corporation and accompanied by a pledge not
to tax such such corporation beyond the extent of the
bonus, was a contract binding on the State and operat-
ing in favor of the stockholders personally as well as
of the corporate capital. In the case now under consid-
eration there was no pledge that such annual per cent. of
profits should be forever accepted in lieu of other tax
nor did the question of individual taxation of stock-
holders come before the court. The majority of the
court, concurring with Mr. Justice M'Lean, held that
the law of 1845 created a contract binding on the banks
established under it and on the State; and that Lhe act
of 1851 impaired the obligation of that contract and
was therefore unconstitutional and void.
The feature of the opinion which must make it of
lasting interest to all students of this subject, is the
argument that a State, in granting an irrevocable exemp-
tion from taxation does not relinquish a part of its
sovereign power. The learned Justice says :
"The assumption that a State, in exempting cer-
tain property from taxation, relinquishes a certain part
of its sovereign power is unfounded. The taxing power
may select its objectS of taxation; and this is generally
regulated by the amount necessary to answer the purpos-
es of the State. Now the exemption of property frun
taxation is a question of policy and not of power."
(16 How. 384)
And again s
"A State in granting privileges to a bank, with a
view of offording a sound currency or of advancing any
policy connected with the public interest, exercises its
sovereignty, and for a public purpose, of which it is
the exclusive judge. . . . This act so far from
parting with any portion of its sovereignty, is an ex-
ercise of it. Can any one deny this power to the leg-
islature ? rHas it not a right to select the objects of
taxation and to determine the amount ? To deny either
of these, is to take away State sovereignty." (16 How.
389.)
This argument is specious but it seems to us, fa-
tally weak. It is true that the exemption of property
from taxation is a question of policy. It is equally
true that the legislature may and should exempt property
from taxation whenever there is a sound reason for so
doing. The encouragement of religion and morals, the
advancement of education, even, as the learned Justice
suggests, the providing for a sound currency,- all these
objects and many more may justify a legislature in
granting exemptions from taxation. And it is true,
likewise, that a legislature in so doing does not part
with any portion of its sovereignty. Anglo-Saxon leg-
islatures in all ages have done these very things. -ut
always, and everywhere, save under the judicial inter-
pretations of our own court, such grants have been made
with the understanding that they could be recalled as
the needs or policy of the state might dictate. A -g-
.slaure in exempting church property from taxation
parts with no portion of the State sovereignty ; but a
legislature that attempts to exempt the same property
forever from taxation does attempt to part with a portion
of the State sovereignty. The sovereign power of tax-
ation is the absolute power to tax every kind and all
of every kind of property within the jurisdiution of
the taxing power. Anything less than this is some-
thing less than sovereighty. Therefore the legisla-
ture of Ohio did not part with any portion of the sov-
ereignty of that State in accepting a per cent. on prof-
its in lieu of Taxabion, but it did part with a portion
of the sovereignty in binding all subsequent legisla-
tures to accept the same arrangement.
It is easy to see that such a doctrine might be
carried to the verge of state suicide. Suppose, for
instance, in the case of New Jersey vs. Wilson cited
22
above, that a great city with a million inhabitants had
grown up within the limits of the exempt land. These
citizens, together with millions of property, would have
been forever free from taxation for State purposes in
virtue of an arrangement with the Delaware Indians made
over a hundred years ago. If banks may be exempted from
taxation, so may railroads, and manufactories, and farms,
and property of every description ; and it needs only a
corrupt and worthless legislature in order to tie for-
ever the taxing power of the State in regard to the most
extensive private interests. The exigencies of a State
can never be foreseen. As well might a legislature s -y
that a certain piece of property shall forever be exempt
from the possibility of lawful seizure under the right
of eminent dom,in, as to say that it shall forever be
exempt from taxation. A contract could be madeand a
consideration paid, in one case as well as in another.
But such a law would be no more a contract than would a
law forever yielding the right of the State to exercise
the police power over the same property. A legislature
may always select the objects of taxation and determine
the amount, it may, from considerations of public policy,
exempt certain kinds of property from all taxation wlat-
23
ever, it may consent to receive a fixed amount in lieu
of regular taxation, but it cannot, without yielding up
sovereign attributes, make a binding contract, for a
term of years or forever, the subject 10 matter of which
is the power to tax.
As will be pointed out more in detail later, a
strong minority of the court took this view of the case
and dissented strongly from the doctrine of the prevail-
ing opinion.
The case just under consideration was deuided in
1853. From that time down to the present moment the
question has returned again and again to trouble the
court, and will continue so to return until an indis-
pensible prerogative of sovereignty is vindicated against
the strength of blind precedent. It is needless to
traverse the ground covered by the later decisions fur-
ther than to point out the extent to which the doctrine
has been carried.
Two important cases,-The House of the Friendless
vs. Rouse (8 Wall. 430) and The Washington University
vs. Rouse (8 Wall. 439.),- may be considered together,
as both arose out of the same state of facts. Both
were cases where charitable institutions had been char-
24
tered with a provision exempting them from taxation and
had afterward been subjected to taxation by a subsequent
legislature. Mr. Justice Davis, speaking for the court,
says :
"The validity of this contract is questioned at bar
on the ground that the legislature had no authority to
grant away the power of taxation. The answer to this
position is, tLat the question is no longer open for
argument here, for it is settled by repeated adjudica-
tions of this court, that a State may by contract based
on a consideration, exempt the property of an individual
or corporation from taxation, either for a specified
period or permanently. And it is equally well settled
that the exemption is prestumed to be on sufficient con-
sideration, and binds the State if the charter contain-
ing it is accepted."
It would be difficult to find a plainer statement
of the law established by the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States on this important question, or one more wel-
come to corporate interests.
To this decision there were also dissenting voices
as we shall see when we come to a fuller consideration
of the opposition with which the doctrine of irrevocable
tax-exemption contracts has been met.
In all subsequent cases the question has been treat-
ed as res adjudicata, although the court has from time
to time expressed doubts as to the wisdom of the estab-
lished doctrine. In the case of Willmington Railroad vs.
Reid (13 Wall. 264) and Raleigh and Gaston Railroad Com-
pany vs. Reid (l: Wall. ?69)-the question was so treat-
ed and no dissenting voices seem to have been heard.
In the course of his opinion in the former case, how-
ever, Mr. Justice Davis, speaking for the court, says
"It may be conceded that it were better for the
interest of the State, that the taxing power, which is
one of the highest and most important attributes of
sovereignty, should on no occasion be surrendered. In
the nature of things the necessities of government can-
not always be foreseen, and in the changes of time, the
ability to raise revenue from every species of property
may be of vital importance to the State, but the courts
of the country are not the proper tribunals to apply the
corrective to improvident legislation of this character.
If there be no constitutional restraint on the action of
the legislature on this subject, there is no remedy, ex-
cept through the influence of a wise public sentiment,
reaching and controlling the conduct of the law-making
power."
Other cases of like character have been frequently
before the court during the las score of years, but the
decisions have been uniformly consistent with the lead-
ing cases. (Magee vs. )athis, 4 Wall. 143 ; Tomlin-
son vs. Branch, 15 Wall. 460 ; Tomlinson vs. Jessup, lb.
454 ; Humphrey vs. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244 ; Dodge vs. Wool-
sey 18 Ilow. 331 ; Bank vs. Thomas, 18 How. 384 ; Pacif-
ic Railroad Co., vs. Mctuire, 20 Wall. 36 ; Farrington
vs. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679 ; New Orleans vs. Houston,
119 U. S. 265.)
Opposition to the Doctrine.
The doctrine laid down in the leading cases on the
right of one legislature to grant exemption from taxa-
tion which shall bind all subsequemt legislatures has
not been established without strong and persistent oppo-
sition. A slight survey ofAcircumstances attending the
decision of a few of these cases will amply sustain this
proposition.
The first case, that of New Jersey vs. Wilson
(7 Cranch, 164) was submitted without argument and, as
is intimated in Given vs. Wright (117 U. S. 648, 655)1
might have been very differently determined upon a full-
er consideration of all the facts. The questionable
nature of the subject matter of the supposed contract
in that case, namly, the sovereign prerogative of tax-
ation, does not seem to have occurred to Chief Justice
Marshall ; at any rate it receives no attention in his
opinion. But the subject of taxation was brought for-
cibly to his attention in the famous case of M'Culloci
vs. Maryland (4 Wheat. 316), decided a few years after-
ward, and again in the case of Osborn vs. United States
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Bank ( 9 Wheat. 738). In these cases, while deciding
in favor of the supremacy of the laws of congress and
against the rights of the states to tax "its instruments
employed in the execution of its powers," he enforces the
truths that, "the power of taxation is one of vital im-
portance" ; that "the power of taxing the people and
their property, is essential to the verb existence of
government, and may be legitimately exercised on the
objects to which it is applicable, to the utmost ex-
tent to which the government may choose to carry it";
that "the people of a State give to their government
a right of taxing themselves and their property, and as
the exigencies of government cannot be limited, they
prescribe no limits to the exercise of this right, rest-
ing confidently on the interest of the legislator, and
on the influence of the constitaents over their repre-
sentative, to guard them against its abuse." (4 Wheat.
428) Here was a statement of principles which might
have carried the learned Chief Justice to a different
decision in New Jersey vs. Wilson, had they been clearly
before him in the consideration of that case. They were
before him, as we shall presently see, in the considera-
tion of Providence Bank vs. Billings (4 Pet. 514), decid-
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ed in 1830, and doubtless did much to induce the rule of
construction in that case which has ever since control-
led the Supreme Court in its adjudication of tax-exemp-
tion causes. These two cases, New Jersey vs. Wilson
and Providence Bank vs. Billings, comprise the law as
it was established by Chief Justice Marshall and his as-
sociates, and as it has continued, practically unim-
paired since their day. But the opposition, as already
stated, has been strong and persistent.
In the case of the State Bank of Ohio vs. Knoop
(16 How. 369) three justices, Catron, Daniel and Camp-
bell, dissented and Chief Justice Taney refused his as-
sent to the doctrine of the controlling opinion although
he concurred in its conclusions. Two of the justices,
Catron and Campbell wrote dissenting opinions. The
dissent of Mr. Justice Catron rests mainly upon ihe prop-
C
osition, boldly asserted and streuously maintained,
"that, according to the constitution of all the
states of the Union, and even of the British parliament,
the sovereign political power is not the subject of
contract so as to be vested in an irrepealable charter
of incorporation, and taken away from and placed beyond
the reach of, future legislatures ; that the taxing power
is a political power of the highest class, and each
successive legislature having vested in it, unimpaired,
New Jersey vs. Wilson was decided in 1812 ; l'Cul-
lock vs. Maryland in 1819 ; and Osborn vs. U.S. Bank in /e2q,
all the political powers previous legislatures had, is
authorized to impose taxes on all property in the State
that its constitution does not exempt." (16 How. 404)
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Campbell
goes to the same point, but with such firmness of logic
and with such force of statement, as to make it the
"leading opinion" among a large and increasing number of
dissenting voices on this important question of consti-
tutional law. A few extracts will show the nature ajd
scope of his argument.
"The powers of that assembly in general, and that
of taxation especially, are trust powers, held by them
as magistrates, in deposit, to be returned after a short
period, to their constituents, without abuse or dimi-
nution.
"The nature of the legislative authority is incon-
sistent with an inflexible stationary system of adminis-
tration. Its office is one of vigilance over the vary-
ing wants and changing elements of the association, to
the end of ameliorating its condition.
"The subject matter of this section fof the law of
1845 previously referred to: is the contributive share
6f an important element of the productive capital of the
State to the support of its government. The duty of
all to make such a contribution in the form of an equal
and apportioned taxation, is a consequence of the social
organization. The right to enforce it is a sovereign
right, stronger than any proprietary claim to property.
The amount to be taken, the mode of collection, and the
duration of any particular assessment or form of col-
lection, are questions of administration submitted to
the discretion of the legislative authority ; and vari-
ations must frequently occur, according to the mutable
conditions, circumstances, or policy of the State,
(16 How. 407)
We shall sei later that these sound principles of
government have since received the sanction of another
strong and determined minority of the Supreme Court. It
is safe to say that a large majority of the profession
would give their assent to the propositions laid down
in these opinions of the minority of the court.
In an opinion given in another case at the same
term, Chief Justice Taney says that while he concurs in
the judgment of the majority of the court in State Bank
of Ohio vs. Knoop, he dissents from the reasoning on
which the decision rests. His own views are explained
in the following extract :
"Powers of sovereignty confided to the legislative
body of a State are undoubtedly a trust committed to
them, to be executed to the best of their judgment for
the public good ; and no one legislature can, by its
own act disarm their successors of any of the powers
or rights of sovereignty confided by the people to the
legislative body, unless they are authorized to do so
by the constitution under which they are elected. They
cannot, therefore by contract, deprive a future legis-
lature of the power of imposing any tax4mmay be neces-
sary for the public service- or of exercising any other
act of sovereignty confided to the legislative body,
unless the power to make such a contract is conferred
upon them by the constitution of the State". (The Ohio
Life Ins. & Trust Co., vs. Debolt, 16 How. 416, 431.)
In the case of The Home of the Friendless vs.
Rouse (8 Wall. 430) and Washington University vs. Rouse
(8 Wall. 439) three of the eight judges sitting strongly
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dissented from the prevailing opinion. The three were
Chief Justice Chase and Justices Field and Miller, the
last of whom wrote the dissenting opinion and entered
a solemn protest against the dangerous doctrine that was
to receive a new sanction in the case at bar. "To hold"
he says, "that any one of the annual legislatures can,
by contract, deprive the State forever of the power of
taxation, is to hold that they can destroy the govern-
ment which they are appointed to serve, and that their
action in that regard is strictly lawful". In Pacific
Railroad Co. vs. McGuire (20 Wall. 68) Justices Clifford
and Miller dissented and Chief Justice Waite put his
assent upon other grounds than that the tax emption was
a contract which a subsequent legislature could not im-
pair. In Farrington vs. Tennessee (95 U. S. 679) three
judges, Strong Clifford and Field dissented from the
prevailing opinion. Thus it will be seen that the doc-
trine f one legislature can forever tie up the hands
of its successors in a matter of sovereign importance,
was first *,enunciated in a case submitted without argu-
ment and decided without investigation, was afterwards
rigidly limited by the same great jurist who promulgated
it, and has since been repeatedly disaffirmed and re-
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jected by a strong minority of the court who are firm in
the belief that the doctrine must finally be abandoned. 0
V
Limitations and Applications of the Doctrine.
I. Exemption will not be presumed. Reference has
already been made to the limitation of the doctrine of
New Jersey vs. Wilson in the subsequent case of Provi-
dence Bank vs. Billings. It is now necessary to point
out more specifically the nature of this limitation.
The Providence Bank was created under a charter
which contained no provision whatever on the subject of
taxation, but authorized the bank "to employ its capital
in banking transactions for the benefit of the stock-
holders, and bound the State to permit these transac-
tions and restrained it from passing any cat that would
destroy the profits of the bank. A few years later the
legislature of Rhode Island passed an act taxing the
bank and this was resisted by the bank on the ground
that it impaired the obligation of the contract embodied
in the charter. In the course of his opinion Chief
Justice Marshall says :
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"That the taxing power is of vital importance, that
it is essential to the existence of government are truths
which it cannot be necessary to re-affirm. They are
acknowledged and asserted by all. It would seem
that the relinquishment of such a power is never to be
assumed. We will not say that a State may not relin-
quish it, that a consideration sufficiently valuable to
induce a partial release of it may not exist ; but, as
the whole community is interested in retaining it un-
diminished, that corrununity has a right to insist that
its abandonment ought not to be presumed in a case in
which the deliberate purpose of the State to abandon it
does not appear." (4 Pet. 561)
The principle enunciated in this case received re-
affirmation and sanction in the leading case of Charles
River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge (11 Pet. 420) The ques-
tion there at issue was not one of exemption from taxa-
tion but of exemption from competition, or in other words,
a question of monopoly. The charter of the Charles Riv-
er Bridge Company contained no provision as to exclusive
privileges ; afterward the legislature granted to the
Warren Bridge Company a franchise for erecting a bridge
which would, at the expiration of a few years, become a
free bridge, and thus destroy utterly the value of the
Charles River Bridge Compan ,'s property. The latter
company contended that its charter contained an implied
contract on the part of the State not to grant to any
other person any privileges which would destroy the
value of its franchise. On this point Chief Justice
Taney says "
"The object and end of all government is to pro-
mote the happiness and prosperity of the connunity by
which it is established ; and it can never be assumed
that the goverrmient intended to diminish its power of
accomplishing the end for which it was created. . .
The continued existence of a government would be of no
great value, if by implications and presumptions, it was
disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends
of its creation, and the functions it was designed to
perform, transferred to the hands of privileged corpo-
rations. .. . . While the rights of private property
are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the com-
munity also have rights, and that the happiness and well
being of every citizen depends on t!,eir faithful preser-
vation." (11 Pet.547,548)
The principle adopted in these two leading cases
has continued to govern the court in its subsequent
consideration of legislative grants. As we are par-
ticularly concerned only with grants of tax exemptions,
it will be unnecessary to do more than cite a few of the
cases of that character in which the principle has been
applied. Mention has already been made of Mr. Justice
Miller's complaint that the court has "been, at times,
quick to discover a contract that it might be protected,
and slow to perceive that what are claimed to be contracts
were not so by reason of the want of authority in those
who profess to bind others." (Washington University vs.
Rouse, 8 Wall. 439,442. ) While this charge is abund-
antly sustained by facts, it is, on the other hand,
equally true that the court has been slow to discover
legislative contracts where they rest in any degree
upon implication. And indeed the court has carried this
doctrine of strict construction of legislative grants to
such a length, that Mr. Justice Miller finds himself
constrained in a recent case to dissent together with
Chief Justice Waite, and Justices Field and Bradley,
from the prcvailing decision of the court. The case
is a peculiar one and wotthy of careful study.
In 1853 the legislature of Louisaanna grahted a
charter to the Vicksburg, Shreveport and Texas Railroad
Company, the second section of which read as follows :
"The capital stock of said company shall be exempt from
taxation, and its road, fixtures, workshops, warehouses,
vehicles of transportation, and other appurtenances,
shall be exempt from taxation for ten years after the
completion of said road within the limits of this State."
Owing to the fact that the completion of the road was
delayed by the outbreak of the Civil War, the State
undertook to tax the property in use upon the completed
portion, and the courts were called upon for a construc-
tion of the exemption clause. After reiterating the
doctrine of Providence Bank vs. Billings and other
36
cases to the same effect, the court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Gray, says :
OIn their natural and legal meaning, the words 'for
ten years after the completion of said road' as distinct-
ly exclude the time preceding the completion of the
road, as the time succeeding the ten years after its
completion. . . . To hold that the words of exemption
used by the legislature include the time before the
completion of the road would be to insert by construction
what is not to be found in the language of the contract
to presume an intention, which the legislature has not
manifested in clear and unmistakable terms, to surren-
der the taxing power ; and to go against the uniform
current of the decisions of this court upon the subject.'
(Vicksburg,etc. R.R. Co. vs. Dennis, 116 U.S. 665. )
From this construction of the exemption clause the
four judges already mentioned dissented, and concurred
in the opinion that "this exemption was designed to aid
the road, and was, therefore, much more needed during
its construction than when completed. It seems like
a perversion of the purpose of the statute to hold that
it intented to impede by its burden the progress of the
desired work, and relieve it of the burden only when
finished." It is significant that Justices Miller and
Tield were the only judges taking part in t~ie decision
of the Home of the Friendless vs. Rouse and Washington
University vs. Rouse who were still on the bench when
Vicksburg etc. R.R. Co. vs. Dennis was decided. From
the doctrine of irrevocable legislative tax contracts
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established by the former case they strongly dissented.
From the severe application in the latter case of the
doctrine of strict construction in determining the mean-
ing of such contracts they dissented with equal earnest-
ness. Radically opposed to the doctrine in 1869 they
find themselves the conservative members of the court in
1886. It is interesting, in view of these facts, to
speculate as to what would have been the attitude of the
court in 1886 toward the whole subject of tax exemption
contracts had it come up as a new question and not as a
res adjudicata.
The court has however been thoroughly consistent
in its avowed purpose to construfall legislative grants
strictly against the grantee and to uphold no claims
that rest on implication. Thus wiere one company was
invested with the powers and privileges and subjected to
the obligations contained in certain enumerated sec-
tiohs of the charter of another, and one of the enumer-
ated sections exempted that other company from taxation,
it was held that the exemption did not pass to the new
company. (Railroad Company vs. Commissioners, 103 U.S.I.)
So where by legislative enactment a railroad was to pay
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an annual bonus of $10,000 and its stock was to be as-
sessed to the amount of the costs of construction, it
was held that subsequent legislation levying a general
tax upon the gross receipts upa of all transportation
companies applied to this railroad, and that the origi-
nal plan of taxation was not a surrender of the right
of the state to tax in any other way it might see fit.
(Erie Railway Company vs. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall. 492.)
And other cases go to sustain the fixed doctrine that
"the power to tax rests upon necessity, and is inher-
ent in every sovereignty, and there can be no presump-
tion in favor of its relinquishment". (Bailey vs. Ma-
guire 22 Wall. 215, 226. See also Delaware Railroad
Tax, 18 Wall. 206 ; Central R.R.Co. vs. Georgia, 92 U.S.
670 ; Hoge vs. Railroad Co. 99 U.S. 348 ; Bank vs. Ten-
nessee, 104 U.S. 493 ; Railroad Co. vs. Loftin, 105 U.S.
258 ; Memphis Gas Co. vs. Shelby Co. 109 U.S. 398 ;
Chicago etc. R.R.Co. vs. Guffey, 120 U.S. 569 ; Id. 122
U.S. 561.)
II. Exemption without a Consideration is not a
Contract. A second and very important limitation of
the doctrine of irrevocable tax exemption contracts is
to be found in the repeated decisions of the Federal
Supreme Court that an exemption which is a mere gratuity,
with no consideration passing from the beneficiary to the
State, is not a ccntract and is repealable at the pleas-
ure of the grantor. This was so decided in the leading
case of Christ Church vs. Philadelphia ( 24 How. 300.)
In 1832 the legislature of Pennsylvania enacted that
"the real property, including ground rents now belong-
ing and payable to Chrict Church Hospital in the City
of Philadelphia, so long as the sane shall continue to
belong to the said hospital, shall be and remain free
from taxes." In 1851 an act was passed under which this
property became subject to taxation. It was held that.-
"The concession of the legislature was spontaneous,
and no service or duty, or other remunerative condition,
was imposed on the corporation. It belongs to the cl ass
of laws denominated privilegia favorabilia. It attach-
ed only to such real property as belonged to the corpo-
ration, and while it 1KzINxgiR& remained as its property
but it is not a necessary implication from these facts
that the concession is perpetual, or was designed to
continue during the corporate existence. Such an in-
terpretation is not to be favored, as the power of taxa-
tion is necessary to the existence of the State, and
must be exerted according to the varying condition of
the Commonwealth. The act of 1833 belongs to a class
of statutes in which the narrowest meaning is to be
taken which will fairly carry out the intent of the
legislature. "
The general statement is that such a stipulation
between individuals "would belong to the category of
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nude pacts. It has no higher character because one of
the parties was a State the other a corporation, and it
was put in the form of a statute. (Tucker vs. Ferguson
22 Wall. 527, 573) Such acts amount frequently to mere
bounty laws dictiited by public policy,and determinable
at the will of the legislature. Such was held to be
the case where a State offeroto exempt from taxation
all real and personal property used in the manufacture
of salt, and afterward limited the exemption to five
years. But the court in that casie stated that had the
san provision been contained in a special charter,
which the corporation had accepted amd acted upon, it
would have constituted a contract. (Salt Company vs.
East Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373) In other words what would
be an irrevocable contract under a special charter is a
mere gratuity under a general law. (Welch vs. Cook
97 U.S. 541)
It was this same distinction between a contract
and a gratuity that led to the majority decision in
Home of the Friendless vs. Rouse (8 Wall. 430), a de-
cision that Mr. Burroughs in his valuable work on taxa-
tion (pp. 115--117) finds great difficulty in reconciling
with the principle laid down in Christ Church vs.
Ijilacelnbia. In te fnrmnr ca th excom-
granted by special charter "for the purpose of encour-
aging" the establishment of a charitable institution
in the latter case it was granted because it had been
"represented that in consequence of the decay of the
buildings of the hospital, and the increasing burdens of
taxation, its means are curtailed and its usefulness
limited." In the former case the corporation was in-
duced to act on the promise of exemption ; in the latter,
the corporation was sitplyrelieved of burdens which it
was lawfully required to bear.
While this distinction may serve to clear away the
difficulties raised by Mr. Burroughs' objections, the
exception taken by him to Mr. Justice Davis' dictum in
the Home of the Friendless vs. Rouse that "it is equally
well settled that the exemption is presumed to be on
sufficient consideration," is certainly well grounded.
It is now an elementary principle in all these cases that
"the contract must be shown to exist," that "there is
no presumption in its favor," and that "every reasonable
doubt should be resolved against it." ( Tucker vs. Fer-
guson 2f Wall. 575) And every such exemption must be
upon a consideration in order to constitute an irrevoca-
ble contract. (Cases cited supra. West Wisccnsin Co.
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vs. Supervisors 93 U.S. 595 ; lome Insurance Company vs.
City Council 93 U.S. 116.
III. Exemption is a Personal Privilege a-id not
Transferable. The general doutrine of irrevocable tax
exemption contract has received a further important lim-
itation in the decision of the Supreme Court that such
exemption is a personal privilege, does not attach in
rem, and does not pass with the sale of the franchises
and property of the original beneficiary. This impor-
tant question was first squarely decided in the case of
Morgan vs. Louisiana (93 U.S. 217) which has ever since
been regarded as a leading authority. The legisla-
ture of Louisiana had in 1853 incorporated the Yew Or-
leans, Opelousas and Great Western Railroad Company with
a clause exempting the capital stock from taxation for-
ever, and the works, fixtures rolling-stock and appur-
tenances, for the space of ten years after the ccmple-
tion of the road. The road was sold in 1869 on execu-
tion aid passed into the possession of Morgan. The
State afterwards sued Morgan for taxes upon the road and
he sut up as a defence the exemption clause of 1853.
The question thus presented was whether, under the des-
ignation of franchises, the immunity from taxation upon
property of the road passed to the purchaser. The Su-
preme Court decided that it did not, but that the ex-
emption "was a mere personal privilege of the conpany,
and, therefore, not transferable to others."
The court in the same decision defined aad fixed
the meaning of the term "franchise", so far as such def-
inition was necessary in the discussion of tax exemp-
tion privileges. It said
"The term must always be considered in connection
with the corporation or property to which it is alleged
to appertain. The franchises of a railroad corpora-
tion are rights or privileges which are essential to
the operations of the corporation, and without which its
road and works would be of little value ; such as the
right to run cars, to take tolls, to appropriate earth
and gravel for the bed of its road, or water for its
engines, and the like. They are positive rights or
privileges, without the possession of which the road
of the company could not be successfully worked. Immu-
nity from taxation is not one of them. The former may
be conveyed to the purchaser of the road as part of
the property of a company ; the latter is personal, and
incapable of transfer without express statutory direc-
t i on. "
The general principle enunciated in Morgan vs.
Louisiana has governed the court in all subsequent ad-
judications of the questions there involved, and has
done much to limit the sweeping force of the leading
cases. Yet this decision was not reached without a
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serious divergence from a former decision, and a diver-
gence which has widened with the lapse of time. The
former decision referred to is that in the case of Hum-
phrey vs. Pegues (16 Wall. 244) where the court held
that a charter conferring on one company "all the powers,
rights and privileges granted by the charter" of another
company, carried with it the exemption from taxation
enjoyed by the original company. To reconcile this
decision with those of subsequent cases of a like
character, has proved a troublesome matter. In Morgan
vs. Louisiana the distinction was placed on the ground
that while immunity from taxation might pass under the
term "privilege", it could not pass under the sale of
"franchises". In Railroad Companies vs. Gaines (97 U.S.
697) the distinction was placed on the ground that while
immunity from taxation might pass under a general
grant of "all the powers, rights, and privileges", it
would not pass under a similar grant limited by the
words "for the purpose of making and using said road".
In short the strictest possible rule of construction
has been followed in all cases subsequent to Morgan vs.
Louisana, and the court has uniformly refused to uphold
an alleged immunity from taxation where the franchises
to which the immunity was originally attached had been
transferred.
It may be stated as a general rule, supported by
numerous cases, that immunity from taxation is a person-
al privilege, and does not attach to or run with the
property or franchise, and is not transferable unless by
a new and expressf authorization by the legislature.
(Wilson vs. Gaines 103 U.S. 417 ; R.R.Co. vs. Hamblen,
102 U.S. 273 ; R.R.Co. vs. Commissioners, 103 U.S. 1 ,
Louisville etc. R.R.Co. vs. Palmes, 109 U.S. 204 ;
Memphis R.R.Co. vs. Commissioners, ll2 U.S. 465 ; St.Lou-
is R.R.Co. vs. Berry, 113 U.S. 465 ; Chesapeake R.R.Co.
vs. Miller, 114 U.S. 176)
IV. Exemption of One of Two Consolidated Corna-
nies does not Exempt Both. A new phase of the question
is presented in those cases where two companies are con-
solidated, one of which is by law exempt from taxation
and the otther not. Of course here, as elsewhere, the
plainly expressed intent of the legislature to exempt
the new company formed by the consolidation, will be en-
tirely conclusive. But in the absence of any statutory
provisions, the rules of construction laid down by
the courts will govern.
It may be stated broadly that where two companies
are consolidated, each of which was exempt from taxation
under its original charter, the new company will also
be exempt unless the act authorizing the consolidation
provides otherwise. (Tennessee vs. Whitworth, 1.7 U.S.
129) In such a case the presumption is that the new
company takes all the powers and privileges which were
possessed by the two original corporations at the time
of their union, and this presumption can be rebutted on-
ly by proving a contrary intention on the part of the
legislature.
In case one of the consolidated capanies was ex-
empt and the other not, and the act authorizing the con-
solidation provides that the consolidated companies
shall possess all the rights and privileges which each
of the companies enjoyed under its charter, the exemp-
tion from taxation extends only to thFat portion of the
aggregated property which was, at the time of the union,
exempt under the charter of the favored company. (Phil.
Wil. & Balt. R.R.Co. vs. daryland, 10 How. 377 ; Tomlin-
son vs. Branch, 15 Wall. 460 ; Delaware R.R.Tax, 18 Wall.
206 ; Central R.R.Co. vs. Georgia, 92 U.S. 665 ; Chesa-
peake & O.R.R.Co. vs. Virginia, 94 U.S. 718 ; Railroad
Co. vs. Maine, 96 U.S. 499 ; Green Co. vs. Conness, 109
U.S. 104) But even in such a case, the rule must be
taken with the qualification that the new company possess-
es such transferred powers, privileges and immunities,
only so far as they can be exercised and enjoyed by
it, with its different officers and distinct constitu-
tion. (R.R.Co. vs. Maine, 96 U.S. 499, 509.) Wherever
the new corporation is not so constituted as nvsk to
perform the condition precedent to exemption or commu-
tation of taxation, it can lay no claim to such privi-
lege.
VI
The Tendency of the Court.
From this brief survey of the law of legislative tax-
exemption contracts, it must be evident that there has
been a marked change in popular, and even judicial,
opinion since the cases of New Jersey vs. Wilson and
Dartmouth College vs. Woodward were given to the world.
At that time corporations were few in number and of in-
considerable importance. Sincd then there has been a
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remarkable increase in the number of corporations and a
constant growth of corporate power. The exercise of
such power in the corrupting of legislators and the pro-
curing of legislation favorable to corporations and dan-
gerous to public interests, and the alarming combinations
and "trusts" which have been formed within the past
years,,have justly excited public discussion as to the
control of these bodies. It is altogether probable that
this discussion will increase rather than diminish during
the next score of years, and that the principles stated
in the preceding pages will be again and again argued in
the courts and before the people.
That the Supreme Court is alive to the necessity
of a more stringent control of corporations may be clear-
ly gathered from a study of the decisions in the "Ware-
house Cases" (94 U.S. 113), the"Granger Cases" (94 U.S.,
155, 164, 179, 180, 181 ; 108 U.S. 526), the"Railroad
Commission Cases", (116 U.S. 307, ) and Spring Valley
Water Works Co. vs. Schotter (110 U.S. 347). So far
has the court gone in these cases in order to leave the
legislature free to control corporations, that a strong
minority of the court and the great body of the profes-
sion have been unable to reconcile the cases with the
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principles laid down in Dartmouth College vs. Woodward.
It is safe to say that this tendency will continue.
It may even happen, at a not very remote contingency,
that the court will depart utterly from the doctrine of
the leading case. There are not wanting those who think
that it has already gone far in that direction. But
whatever may be the outcome as to general questions in-
volved in charter rights, it has been predicted by a
very eminent authority- Mr. Justice Miller- that the
court will finally abandon altogether the doctrine that
the taxing power can be restricted or destroyed by ex-
emptions contained in corporate charters: (8 Wall. 444
While such a reversal of the leading cases would un-
doubtedly give an unpleasant shock to our judicial sys-
tem it may well be a matter of serious reflection wheth-
er, after all, it would not be in the interests of good
government and an enlightened public policy.

